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ConcLusion   
TheJapanSocialistParty（JSP）wasfoundedinOctober1945，thereby  
unifyingvariouspre－WarSOCialistfactions．TheJSPmade aluckystart  
andformed asocialistrleadingcoalition cabinetin1947．Afterthesevere  
defeatinthe1949generalelection，SOCialists’forcebegantoriseagaln．In  
theendofthe1950s，theJSPsecuredaboutonethirdoftheDietseats，167  






comments and criticismslamindebted to the atendants at the c（）nference on the  
1955－SytemiIIJapan，he】d at HooverInstitutiollin March，1988，eSpeCially to  
TetsuyaKataoka，Chairmanoftheconference．Thedraftofthisessaywasp11blished  
in Tetsuya Kataoka ed，，The1955System：The Origin ofJapan’s Politics（Ann  
Arbor，Michigan：University of Michigan Press．1989）．In this essay．Irevised the  
draft verymuch．  
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But sucha favourablecondition fortheJSP did notlastlong，In the  
latterhalfofthe1950s．theJapaneseeconomybegantogrowrapidlyand  
the1960sfoundmoreandmorepeopleenjoyingnewcomsumerlife．The  
socialstructureofthiscountry also begantOChange．TheJSP seem to  
have failedin adaptingltSelf to these changes▲In the first half of the  
1960s，the party was on a plateau；in thelatter half，it experienced a  
suddendecline．The year1960，WhenJapanunderwent agreat upheaval  
causedbythe controversy over the revision of the USTJapan Security  
Treaty．wasawatershedintheJSP’shistory．   




Needless to say，pOliticsis the art of the possibility．Historyis an  
amalgamation ofirresistible environmentalelements a11d more orlcss  
positive choices of various actors．Thcn，itis worthwhile toinvestigate  
SOmCpOSSjbilitiesopentotheJSPsothatwemightmorefullyunderstand  
Japanese politics．   
MostpoliticalscientistsstudyingmodernJapanesepoliticshavetended  
toconcentratetheir attentionontheLDP，neglectingtheJSPandother  
minorparties．Ofcourse，thisisunderstandablc．ThoughtheJSPhasbeen  








and the significance of the opposition par－ties，eSPeCially theJSP．The  
article ofKataokainthisvolumeisone ofgoodexamplesofthistrend．  
HearguesthattheJSPhcIpedthemainstreamoftheLDP，theYoshida  
faction，tOeffectivelyresist againstthepressurefromtherightwing of  
theLDPandtheclaimofAmericatorearnl．Ontheotherhand，Mabuchi  
pointed outJSP’sinfluenceover the distr－ibutive policy sphere，SuCh as  
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Welfarepolicy．（4）Dcliberlationproceduresandrathershortsessionofthe  
Dietalso gives advantage to the opposition parties；they do havemore  
influencethanexpected fromtheirforcesin the Diet．（5）   
Anyway，theJSPhasbeenplayinganimportant rolein the postwar  
Japanese politicalsystem．To discuss various aspects of the socialist  
POliticsinJapanstillremainssignificant．Inthischapter，Iwillanalyse  
thecausesoftheJSP’sstagnationfocussingonfivedifferentpoints：（1）  
theJapanesepoliticalculturesurroundingtheJSP：（2）thedeficit ofthe  
JSP’s ruralpolicies；（3）the failure of the Katayama Cabinet，the only  
Cabinetledbysocialists；（4）theshortageoftheJSP’slocalgovernment  
activities；（5）1eft，Wing dominance and electoralstrategies of theJSP．  
Beforediscussing thesepoints、1et’shave a bird’s－eyeview oftheJSP’s  
historyuntilnow．（6）  
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1．FourStagesoftheJSP’s History  
In this paper，the elector’algains andlosses of politicalparties are  
tracedinrespectoftheirshareoftheelectorate，nOttheirpercentageof  
votes．Usingsuchanilldexhasanumberofmerits．Foronething，WeCan  
exclude the temporaleffectsofchanglngturnOut SO that thelongterm  
trendsofthepartiesmaybecomec］earer．Second，uSingtheindexofthe  
Shareoftheelectoratecanbringcasestolightwhereonepartyseemsto  
lose electoralsupport evenifit obtains more votes thanin theprevios  
election，Onthefluctuationoftheturnout．（7）Thenetstrength Dfaparty  
canbeestimatedin termsofitscapacltytOget VOterSgO tO thepolling  
Stations and writethe names ofits candidates（inJapan．a11adults are  
automaticallyenlistedontheelectoraterolls），thoughthedataofopinion  
po11s，the share of votes and the share of seats are also takeninto  




be dividedinto three orfour periods．  
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★includingconservativepartiesti】11955andwinnjngconservativeindependents・   
※※includingtherightandtheleftJSPduringits195155divisionandtheshort  
lived Labourers－Farmars Party．  
Figurel ShareoftheElectorateatGenerall引ections  
a．Periodl：1945－60  




members of both parties now frequently discuss the possibility of a  
reunlOn．   
Thisperiod also saw the first and thelast socialistic Cabinet，1ed by  
PrimeMjnisterTetsuKatayama．Aftertheunexpectedvictoryinthe1947  
gelleralelection，theJSPdecided，Or WaSCOmpelled，tO forma Cabinct  
withtwoconservativeparties．TheJSPalsoparticipatedinthesucceed－  
ingAshidagovernrnent．ThoughthetⅥ■osuccesSivecabinetssurvivedfor  
Only sixteen monthsin total，theJSl）remained as one of the most  
powerfulparties till1955，because of the conflict among conservative  
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Ontheotherhand，亡heJSPsufferedfromcentrifugaltrends．First，the  
extremeleftwingaswellastheextremerightsecededfromthepartyin  
1948，thoughmost of the memberslater rejoined theJSP．The main  
Streamitself was twice split as a result ofideologicaldifferences．Thc  
firstsplitlastedforonlytwomonths，butthesecondcontinued for four  
years（1951－55）．Thencamethedefection oftheDSPin1959．  
ItwasfortunatefortheJSPthattheconservativesbegantoIosevotes  
afterits1952peak，After that their decline wassolinear and theJSP’s  
growthso steady that manyJapanese anticipated theJSP wouldbein  
powersoonerorlater．Thesocialistswerever’yoptlmisticforafewyears．   
Another feature of this period was that theleftwing of theJSP  
expandedintermsofthenumberofDietmembersfasterthantheright  
Wing．In1953theelectedmembersoftheformeroutnumberedthoseofthe  
latter．Theleftwingbeganto oppresstheright duringthisperiod．The  
secessionof theDSPcan beexplainedin thiscontext．  
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Inthe1960generalelection，theJSPlost5．2percentofitsshareofthe  




Inthissence，theDSP’sseccessiondirectlydamagedtheJSP and made  
themlose5percentoftheelectorate，Whichamountedtoaround25seats  
in the Lower House．   
On the other hand，the LDP waslosing votes as before，despite the  




Althoughmostsocialistsandsocialdemocratswere discouragedby the  
LDP’soverwhelmingmajorityintheDietandbythefactthattheycould  
SeenOimprovementintheirelectoralresultssince1960，itwasinaway  
．ヽ、／言侶■   
duringthisperiodthat theywereclosest topower・   
ChangesappearedintheJSPinthelastfewyearsofthe1950s，First，  
controversies over the party’s basic strategy，known as the structual  
reformdebates，1edtofactionalreshuffles．Thenewright－winggroupled  
by Saburo Eda，a formerleft－wing activist who advocated the new  
doctrineofsocialismcalled“structualreformtheory’’，graduallybeganto  
attractnot afewsympathizers，inspiteoftheunchangedpredominance  
Oftheleftwing．   










CentOfthe electorate；Since then，the party has not recovered theloss，  
staying on alowerplane for severalyears．At thistime，the sudden fa11  
WaSnOtCauSedbyanydefectionorsplit，aSinthecaseof1960．TheDSP  
keptitsoriginalelectoralsupport．TheRussianinvasionofCzechoslova，  
kiain August1968and the Chinese turbulence caused by the“great  
Culturalrevolution”inthe’60spartia11y affectedtheelection▲Therecan  
besomeotherreasons．Butthisisnotthetopicofthispaper．   
On the other hand，the conscrvatives atlast reached thelevelof the  
lowestsupportinspiteofthesecessionofasmallandshort－1ivedgroup，  
theNewLiberalClub（NLC，WhichsplitawayfromtheLDPin1976but  
returnedin1987）．The sum of the LDP’s sharc and that of the NLC  
fluctuated around34．5percen during this period．The defection ofthe  
NLC，however，annOyedtheLDPintheDietbecausetheyrefusedtoally  
withtheLDP．TheLDPfouTlditdifficulttomaintainamaJOrityineither  
ofthe Houseswithoutanally．  
Insofar asthelocallevelisconcerned，aninterestingchangecanbe  
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POinted to．Theleft－wing parties，eSpeCially theJSP and theJapan  
Communist Party（JCP），SuCCeSSfully attacked conservative powerin  




The progressivelocalgovernments had a significallt effectin such  
SPheresassocialwelfareadministrationandimprovementoftheenviron－  
ment；theLDPhadtochangesomeofitsnationalpolicies．  
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d．Period4：1976－  
DuringthisperiodtheJSPsufferedfromacreepingdeclineillpartdue  
to the exacerbation of the conflictswith the extremeleft－wing faction  
（the Socialist Society）．SaburoEda，theleader ofoneofright－Wingfac－  




not able to concentrate upon policy－making or upon pressuring the  
government．Finally，SuChturmoilandinertialedtheJSPtoafataldefeat  
illthe1986generalelection：it obtainedonly84seats（one more elected  
joinedthepartylater）comparedwithl12seatsinthe previouselection．   
Many opinion po11s，in the meantime，POintcd to a revivalof the  
COnSerVatives．The LDP started to recover some ofitslost support，  
especiallyafter198O（seeFigure40nP．33）andsometimessucceededin  
attaining a comfortable majorityiIlthe Diet，thoughits share of the  
electoratewas atbest35per cent orso．Theconservativesin totalhad  
morethan290menlberselectedin1980andiIl1986．   
Suchtrendsaffectedtheloca11evel．Theconservativesresumedpowel．  
in manylocalgovernments onceheldbytheprogressives．TheDSPand  
the Komeito（the CleaIIGovernment f）arty，CGP），both of which were  
ratherleft－Oriented formerly，made a turn totheright and allied them－  
Selves with the LDP．Ilereafter，localgovernments，eSPeCially at the  
Prefecturallevelandinlargecities，becamemoreandmoretechnocratic；  
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seeminglyapoliticalrulebyexpertsinadrninistrationbecametheorderof  
theday．   




leftist Socialist Society？As mentioned earlier，however，the following  
discussion willbelimitedonlytotheperiodsa andb．  
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2．Conservative Barrier  
TheJSPfailedtobreakthebarrierofonethirdintheDiet．Incontrast  
WiththeJSP，the LDPhaseverbeeninpowersinceitsfor’mation．Why  
hasthcJSPfailedtobec（）meStrtOnger？Whyhavetheconcervativesbeen  




Very few politicalconflicts or politicalcompartmentalizations steming  
fromreligiousorethniccleavages（theonlyexceptionmightbetheCGP）．  
Moreover，the corelation between socialstrata or occupationalgroups  
alldpoliticalsupportisnotclear．Inthisway，thelackofclassandethnic  
POliticsinJapanexplainstheuninterruptedruleofthe LDP．（8）  
Itis certain that the ethnic minoritiesinJapan such as Ainu，Uilta，  
Korean，and Chinese are so smallin number that they can hardly be  
influentialin politics．Concerning class politics，Class consciousnessis  
generallyweak．EvenindustrialworkersareapttobemoTeloyaltotheir  
companythantotheirownclass．（9）Thehornogeneoussocietyhypothesis  
is rather attractive．It surely giveslight on some aspects ofJapanese  
politics．But one ofits weak poinsis thatit does not explain how the  
homogenietyislinked with the conservative dominance．（10）Evenif we  
assume that thisis self－evident，the hypothesis cannot explain why the  
LDPcontinuedtolosevotesduringthe195Osandthe1960s．   
More popular way of explanation is to associate Japanese political 
culturewith the LDP’selectoralsuccess，In fact，Classes or other social  
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CleavagesdoexistinJapan．ButasFlanaganandRicardsonpoinedout，  






ineptitude of the growing number of opposition partics，eSpeCially the  
JSP．（1Z）   
Of course，itis dangerous to too exaggerate theimporatnce of the  
politicalculture．Someof recentstudies on voting behaviour and party  
SuppOrt reVealthat occupationalinterests，POlicy preference，and other  
SOCialfactorsareimportanttoformvoters’politicalattitude．（13）Butwe  
CannOtignorethepoliticalcultureunderlyingthosefactors，eSpeCiallyin  
dealingwith theJapanese politicsearlyinthe post war period．Indeed，  
Japanese people are very passivein the sphere of politics，thoughit  
remainsmootwhethertheyarestrikinglysoincomparisonwithsomeof  
EuropeannationssuchasItaly．Wheneverresearchersask themifthey  
arewi11ing to particIPatein politics to realize their owninterests and  
jdeas，1essthan twenty percent of them answerpositively，Most people  
prefer to depend（）n their representatives or politicians to realize their  
OWninterests and policy preferences．（14）The passivity toward political  
activitiesleadstoacceptanccofpresentauthoritiesorordersandindirect－  
1yhelptheconservatives．  
Japanese politicalculture helps the conservativesin a more direct  
fashion．C．Hayashistatistica11yanalysestherelationshipbetweenthink・  
ingwayofJapanesein dailylife and theirparty support．He findsthat  
they tendtosupport theLDPnotnecessari】ybecause ofitspoliciesbut  
becausetheylikeitsopportunisticstyleofbehaviourandtraditional，nOt  
fully rational，Way Ofthinking．They areapt tohatethose who strictly  
Clingtosome principlesorideologleS andwho deny what they vaguely  
illlaglneaStraditionalthings．Theyalsodislikeincessantcriticismexpres－  
Sedbytheprogressiviststothepresentstateofthesocietybecausethey  
fee＝timpose psychologicalstrains on themselves，（15）Allthatisleft to  
mentionisthepropencitiesofsomepeopletodefertotheir’Superiorsand  
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suspectasunmoralthosewhuchallengethepresentauthorities．（16）   
Thus，the more a partyinsists on radicalchanges of thesociety and  
politics，CriticizingmercilesslythegovernmentandotherpowerfulLs，the  
more people become opposed to the party．Clearly，SuCh psychologlCal  
tendencydamagesthecommunistsworst．Moreover，gOVernmentSbefore  
the war successfully inculcated the fear of any thoughts criticising the 
existingresime，eSpeCiallythecommunism．Thisisoneofreasonswhythe  
Japan Communist Party（JCP）could not obLain enough votesin the  
SeVeralgeneralelectionsafterthewar．TheJSP，tOO，nOdoubtsuffered，  
andissufferingtosomedegree，fromsuchamentaltendency，thoughit  
hasbeenideologicallymuchmoreflexible than theJCP．Even rational－  
minded conservatives often prove to be unpopular．People are apt to  
prefermodestlyirrationalandpragmaticalconservatives．   
Suchconservativedispositiondidnotchangeverymuchinspiteofthe  




Or SOCialist forces．Evenin the generalelection of1947，When theJSP  
WentSlightlyaheadofanyoftheotherparties，itfai］edtogainanyseats  
inasmanyas17constituencies，mOStOfwhichwerepredominantlyrural．  
One constituencyin the Hokuriku district has not allowed any non－  
COnSerVativecandidatetowininallofthegeneralelectionsafterthewar．   
The conservative atmosphere jn ruralareas crystalizesitselfin the  
form ofjiban．The jiba7？COnSists of severalcounties and a few towns  
Where politicians can always expeCt StrOng electoralsupport．In their  
jibans，they keep manylocalleaders and notables under their control．  
Thoselocalinfluentials，Who are conservative－Oriented，areuSually not  
affiliatedwithanypoliticalparty．Theirauthorityjsapolitical，butthey  




it waslocalnotables many of whom werelandowners that associated  
voterswithcomtervativepoliticians．（2O）Theoccupationreforms，SuChas  
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hadbeenousted．They werenewlyelectedlocalassemblymen，members  
Of newly organizedlocalcommittees，Officials of agricalturalcoopera・  
tives，and thelike．After the war，it was those new notables aselected  
Officeholdersthat actuallyhadauthority overtheordinary people．（Z2）  





Of the prewarinfluentialpoliticians remained considerablyintact even  
after the war．（24）   
Such jiban was personally owned property of each politician，SO tO  
SPeak，andit was possible for him to giveit to another politician or  
WOuld－be politician．Therefore，many neW COnSerVative caIldidates suc－  
Ceededtothejiba72S Ofthepurgedpoliticiansinthefirstgeneralelection  
after the war．（25）Even Shigeru Yoshida had to get a bequeathed jiban  
When he ranin his first generalelection，because he did not have any  
electiveposts whenhewas appolntedas prlmeministerjust beforethe  
new constitutionbecame effective．（26）   
Of course，its electoralimportance did not remain unchanged．New  
notables could hold their offices asIong as they were elected．Their  
POSitionswerenotsostableasprewarlandowners，Asdemocraticthink－  
ingwayattractedmorerura】people，SOtheability ofthejibantomove  
VOterS Shrinked．Some of alert politicians began to seek new typeOf  
VOte－gathering organization，Koenkai，arOund the mid－1950s．（27）The  
Koenkaiistypically a private organization for a politician to organize  
VOterSdirectly，thatis，Withneitherpartyinterventionnordependenceon  
the ability oflocalnotables to gather votes．（28）Today，eVen municipal  
assemblymenplay onlylimitedroleinelectioneering．t29）   
But atleastduringtheearly period aftertheWar，thejibanwas the  
majorobstaclefortheJSP．Itoffsettedthefavourableeffectsontheparty  
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causedbytheoccupationreforms．Infact．itwasdifficultforsocialiststo  
findtheirownruralleadersorsubleaders．Wardpointsoutthatonehas  
tomeetsix requirementsso asto beinfluentialinruralareas：1）to be  
local，2）to haveleisure Linle，3）to havc enough understanding and  
knowlegc about agriculturalproblems，4）to bemiddle－aged or elderly  
men，5）to be of gentle birth，6）not to be affiliated with any political  
Parties．（30）Some of these conditions are somewhat，if not completely，  
contradictory to the ethos of socialisnl．As ruralpeople followedtheir  
leadersnotbecauseofthelatter’spoliticalthoughtbutbecause oftheir  
SOCialauthority，SOCialistsweTenOtabletoenjoyenoughopportunitiesto  
gainaccessto ordinaryvi11agers．   
Wardconcludeshisreportasfollows：  
An appreciabledecreaseinconservative strengthin one of  
Japan’s staunchest conservative areas and the gradualemer－  
genceofaleft－WlngOpPOSitionarelong－termandslowrmovlng  
trends which are subject to future jnterruption，diversion，Or  
distortionintermsoftheirpoliticalconse（1uenCeS．  
As a rnatter of fact，COnSidering the enorrnOuS StreSSeS tO  
which postwarJapanese society has been subjected，the  
continued strength，reSiliency，and adaptability of the tradi－  
tionalsociopoliticalorderandprocessesaremostimpressive．  
Politically．as otherwise，Niiike［thevi11age researched by  




law enactedin1958prompted the merger of municipalities，Japanese  
Citiescontainedmanyruralareaswithintheirboundaries．Inthosedays，  
itwascrucialforallpartiestogainthesupportoffarmersandotherrural  
dwellers．   
BeingassistedbyJapanesepolitical，OraPOliticalculture，manyCOnSerq  
vative politicians were able to easily entrench themselves against the  
SOCialist offensiveand postwardemocratizationintroducedbytheOccu・  
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PationArmyintheruralareas，Whateverofficialpoliciestheypresented  
to their electorates．Evenin urban areas，the conservative tradition  
COntinued tocapturenumerouspeople，includillgSOmeWOuld－besocialist  
activists．Socialists as wellas conservatives with modernized minds  
neededenormousenergytosurvivesuch asituation，  
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3．JSPanditsRuralStrategy   
Thoughthebarriertoentrywashigh，SOCialistsdidenjoyconsiderable  
SupPOrtinsomeruralareas，Wheretheydevelopedanappropriatestrat，  
egy and were more active than conservatives．For example，theJSP  
obtainedmorethanonethirdofallocatedseatsofseventyplCallyagrlCul－  
turalprefecturesin the1947generalelection．Intwo of themtheparty  
WOn eVen a half of the allocated seats．Why was this possible？It was  
Simplybecausemost ofthose areaswere wheresocialists hadstruggled  
Veryhardonbehalfoftenantfarmersforalongtime．Suchafactmight  
SuggeStSOmethingabouttheJSP’sruralstrategy，   
First，theJSP’sagriculturalpolicieshavetobeexamined．Whatkindof  
policiesdiditenvisage？Howdidittrytoorganizefarmersorapproach  
farmers’organizations？   
The agrarian reformis one of the mostimportant politicaleventsin  
postwarhistory．Itdistributedtothetenantsmorethanfivemillionacres  
of farmland previously owned by the landlord class and completely 
OVerthrewtheruleofparasiticlandlords．Needlesstosay，thereformwas  
OrderedbytheOccupationArmy．thoughsomeJapanesebureaucratsand  




should not have been so．   
Besidestheagrarianreform，Variousbillswereenactedtodemocratize  
andimprovetheruralsociety．Forexample，theLandImprovement Act  
WaSenaCtedin1949tohelpcu】tivatorstoexchangetheirpaddyfieldsand  
toenlargethemforconvenience．EachlocalgovernmentWaSOrderedto  
establish an elected agriculturalcommittee，One Of newlyintroduced  
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administrative committees．And moreimportant was the Agricultural  
CooperativeActpassedin1947，Theseactsenlargedthescopeofgovern－  





farmers．   
However，theJSPinthe1940sdidnotmakeanyconcreteproposalsto  
improvefarmlngeXCeptforsomepublicassertionssuchasnationalizlng  
fertiliser companies．Evenin1949，theactionprogram of the party still  
pointedoutthenecessitytoimmediatelyformulateanagriculturalpolicy  
and principles tolead the farmers movements．（34）But socialists spent  
enormous energy（in vain）debating the way of the expected socialist  
revolution．AsregardsagrlCulturalpolicy，theconservativesortheLDP  
did not have any substantialideas either，but they could rely on the  
bureaucrats．They alsocould，and did，preSSure bureaucrats concernlng  
Variousprograms andmeasures．   
Later，theJSPstartedtoformulatemorelogicalagriculturalpolicies．  
Their basicidea wasto“modernize”farmingbyjoint management and  
protectJapaneseagricultureagainsttheinternationalfreetradeinagrar－  
ianproducts．Theparty tried toisolate the agriculturesector from the  
StruCturalchangesintheJapaneseeconomy．Thequestionis，then，howto  
implementsuchascheme，eVenifitwasfeasibletosomeextent．（35）Butit  
WaSnOtClear whatthesocialiststhoughtonthispoint，Anyway，SuCh a  
StreSSOnaCOOperativestyleoffarmingbringsustotheproblemsofthe  
farmers’organizationsandtheirmovements．   
Socialists who participatedin the tenant movements before the war  
formedtheJapanFarmersUnion（JFU）inFebruary，1946．Theystruggled  
fiercelyfortheaccomplishmentofagrarianreformandtheJFUrapidly  
grewin size．Butitis naturalthat the union shrank rapidly after the  
reformwascompleted，becauseitdidnotmademuchefforttopreparcfor  
the post－reform period．Itmight not be too exagerated to say that the  
socialists did notthink ofanyhtingother thanclass struggle，Oncethe  
agraian reform wascompleted，they couldnot persuade farmers ofthe  
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necessjtyofancwkindofc】assbattle．Sincearound1950，theweightof  
farmersin socialistsmovementsincessantly decreasedexceptsuch spe－  
cial cases as where they were threatend to be deprived of their newly 
acquiI．ed farmlandsby thegovernment plannlngtO buildbases forthe  
American army．（36）   
On the otheI．hand，the agriculturalcooperativesintroducedin1947  






COntrOlin the cooperativein eacharea becauseit was almost the only  
Organizationwhich attractedallthefarmers．Ifsocialistscouldgainthe  
leadershipintermsofagricultureandeconomyamongthefarmers，they  
COuldhavewonthefarmers’truStandsecurcdtheirpoliLicalsupport．But  
WeCanhardlyfind theagriculturalcooperativesmentionedintheJSP’s  
majordocuments．   
Thesecond possibletypc ofruralstrategy wasnot directly aimed at  
agriculture，Itwastocontainwidelyrangingpoliciesandprograms：from  
reglOnaldevelopmentpoliciesingeneraltotheimprovement ofspecific  
ruralroads．Earlyinthepostwarperiod，mOStruralpeoplewerepoorand  
localinfrastructures miserable．Apart from the macro plan to develop  
backwardarcas，then，thereremainedmanythingsforpoliticiansto do  
forthebenefit of theirruralvoterS．Ex－Prime ministeI－KakueiTanaka，  
forexample，drewahugeamountofpublicworkprojectstohishackward  




Incontrast to Tanaka，ShoichiMiyake，One Offormerleaders of thc  
tenantmovementinNiigataPrefectureandlaterthevice－Speakerofthe  
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burcaucracy and have them do something for their vi11ages and towns．  
The supporters of this famous socialist Diet member became so disap－  
pointedthat thesupportfortheJSPitselfbegan todeclinein thisarea．  
Manp voters who once had supported the JSP switched their votes to 
Tanaka，thatis，tOtheLDP．Even somesocialist subleadersin thisarea  
deserted theJSP andparticipatedin the Ta11aka’spoliticalrnachine．（38）  
Thisepisodeissuggestivein thinking about theJSP’s generalattitude  
towardslocalproblems．   
Thisisnottosaythatsocialistpoliticiansshouldactinthesameway  
as conscrvatives．Rather，they shouldhave been more sensitive to their  
VOterS’demandsandthroughcopiTlgWiththemworkedoutauniqueand  
realisticdevelopmentalplanoftheirown．Afterall，theJSPcouldnot．or  
didnot，makethemost ofthefruits ofthetenant movements，partially  
becauseitclungblindlytotheideaof“socialistagriculture，”andofclass  
Struggleandregardeditasdishonesttotrytodeveloplocalcommunities  
orlocalagricultureinthemidst ofthecapitalisticsociety．〈39）   
BしItit must be recognizedthat theJSPdidhavesome，ifnotenough，  
rcsourcesandpossibilities．Theyshouldhavemadepositiveuseofthem，  
thoughit was stilldifficult for them to do so，in so far as they were  
alienatedfrompower at thecenter．  
4．Fai1urein Power  
Oneofthebestwaysforapartytogainthetrustofvotersistobein  
POWer and showits governing ability．For example，the Sucial－  
DemocraticPartyinGermany（SPD），Whichwasanoppositionpartyafter  
thc war，decided to form a“grand coalition”government with the  





InJapan，theJSP sharedpowerwithtwoconservativepartiesin1947  
and TetsuKatayama，theleaderoftheJSP，preSided over theCabinet．  
After the Katayama government collapsed，theJSP participatedin  
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anothercoalitiongovernment．ButtheJSPmadesuchfatalmistakesin  
thetwogovernmentsthatitlostconsiderablesupportinthe1949general  
election・Ifsocialistshad administeredthetwogovernmentsbetter，the  
earlyperiodoftheJSPwouldprobablyhavehada positiveimpacton  
theirfuturesupport．WhydidLheyfail？   
FirstcomestheinLentionandpolicychangeoftheGeneralHeadquaters  
Of the Occupation Forces（GHQ）．As the supreme force，GHQ often  
Wielded absoluteinf）uences onJapanese politics．Without the decisive  















electionwhy theformation of theKatayamacoalitiongovernment was  
possible．Asmentioned above，the numberofseats theJSP obtainedin  
that election was far short of the majority，CoaliLion government was  
inevitablefortheJSP，butthethenlargestconservativeparty，theLiberal  
PartyledbyShigeruYoshida，refusedto participatein the government  
ledbythesocialistsattheearlystageofnegotiationamongparties．Ifthe  
SeCOndlargestconservativeparty，theDemocraticParty，hadrejectedthe  
requesttojointhecoalition，theKatayamagovernment wouldnot have  
beenrealized．Indeed，theDemocraticPartysoughtachancetohavetheir  
OWnprimeminister．ItwasthestatementofGHQtosupportKatayama  
that finally made the r）emocratic Party decide to accept the socialist  
Premiershipandjointhecoa】itioncabinet．（42）  
J7  





theKatayama Government wasdamagedbyGHQ’s pressure to purge  
Rikizo fIirano，the then Minister of Agriculture and Forestry；he was  
judgedtohavebeentoosympathetictomilitalismduringthewar・Hirano  





of the Cold War，American goverllment Shiftedits policy stance from  
fartherdemocratization ofJapanto economic recovery ofthiscountry．  
ThisshiftchangedthepowerbalancewithinGHQ，Insteadofprogressive  
groups represented by the Government Section（GS）of the Supreme  
Commander for the Allied Powers（SCAP）which had promoted the  
democratization ofJapan radica11y，COnSerVative，anti－GSgroupsbegan  
to gain power．The）T，eSPeCial】y the second GeneralStaff Section（G2），  
triedtobrakedemocratizationofJapanandbackeduprightistssuchas  
Shigeru Yoshidatomake economicrecoverysmooth．After shortresis，  
tance agalnSt the policy change of his government，MacArthur himself  
SWitchedhissupportto Yoshida’sLiberalParty．（44）   
TheshiftiIIU．S．policydcprivedtheJSPofagoodreasontourgethe  
COnSerVative parties to accept another alliancewith the socialists．1t  
becamealmostimpossiblefortheJSPtogetinpowerunlessitobtained  




governmentJune，1948．   
Behindthiseverlt，tOO，WaSa POWerStrugglewithinGHQ．Thatis，the  
risi11gG2successfully madeuse ofthescandalinwhichit was saidthe  
presidentoftheShowaDenkolnc．（Shoden）bribedseveralpoliticiansand  
bureaucrats，including Premier HitoshiAshida，and exTVice－Premier  
Suehiro Nishio who wasa rightwingleader oftheJSP．Almostallthe  
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SuSpeCtedpoliticianswereofthemiddle－Of－the－rOadcamp supportedby  




SCandalitself was just a frameup by G2．（45）Indeed，mOSt pOliticians，  






of the SCAP．   
Second，theinstability of the Katayama government was partially  
CauSed byits prematurity．Less than two years had passed since the  
formationoftheJSPwhenittookoverpower．ThcJSPneededmoretime  
tosettleitsorganizationalproblemsandtolearnhowto actintheDiet．  
Besides，theJSP obtained only17．6percent oftheelectorate，1ess than  
onethirdofalltheseatsoftheLowerHousein1947，incontrastwith34．  
1percentwhichtheSPDgainedin1965．ItwasinevitablethatthcJSP’s  
initiativein the coalition government was heavily constrained by the  
OVerWhelmingpower oftheconservatives．   
WhentheJSPfounditselftheleadingparty astheresult ofthe1947  
gcneralelectio11、it was hardlypreparedtoleadacabinet．Thepartydid  
notevenexpectedsuchanelectoralsuccess，aSmentionedabove．Infact，  
itreluctantlycameintopowerbecauseit wasundcranillusionthat the  
party politics requestedtheleading party to form a cabinet under any  
circumstances．（16）Butitwaspossible，andcertainlybetter，fortheJSPto  
wait for another chance，because the conservative forces secured the  
maJOrityinall．   
ShigeruYoshida，1eader ofthe LiberalParty，also play anirnpOrtant  
Part，Say，indrivingsocialistsintopower．HeexactlyperCeivedthepoor  
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he took office asprime minister quite reluctantly．When he was faced  
Withthepressureof theGHQ topurge Hirano，hecould not personally  
perSuade Hiranotoresignhisministerialpost．Instead，hcconcealedthe  
realreason to ask HirallO tO reSlgn and complicated the matter．In the  
end，hewascompe11edtodismissHirano．Sorneright－wingDietmember－  
erssympatheticwith Hiranogot angrywith thedismissalanddefected  
theJSP，An10ngthemwasZenko Suzuki，eX－PrimeministeroftheLDP  
government．When theleftwing oftheJSP rebelled agaistthe Cabinet  
over thesupplementarybudget of1948，Katayama did not carry out his  
policydecisively．Hislackofstrongleadershipacceralatedthecentrifugal  
trendsintheJSPandencourageattacksfrombothinsideandoutsidethe  
party，But theJSP did not have any otherleader to take Katayama’s  
Place，Partly because some of the party’sinfluentialleaders had been  
purgedbyGHQ．   
Finally，SOCialistslacked a willingness to maintain the Cabinet．In  
general，pOliticalparties．onceinpower，wi1lendeavortoholdthegovern－  
ment under their controlaslong as possible．But the socialistsin the  
Katayamagovernmentgaveuppowerquiteeasi】y．Asamatter offact，  
theHouseofRepresentativesdidneitherpassavoteofnonconfidencenor  
VOtedownthefullbudget．Thecabinetcouldhavesurvivedalittle】onger，  
providedthat Katayamahaddecidedto stayinpower，thoughhe＼＼TOuld  
perhapshaveencounteredthelnOredifficultproblemofrearmamentsoon  
thereafter．  
If theKatayamagovernment hadsurvivedlonger，theShodenscandal  
might not have occurred．In fact，the government had many talented  
intellectualstocopewiththeproblemsofJapanesesociety．Therefore，if  
the government had had enough time toimplementits policies and  
2〃   
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PrOgramS，thevoterswou】dprobablyhaveevaluatedtheJSP’sabilityto  
rulemorefavourab］y．Theycould haveimprovedtheeconomy，tOO．   
The failure of the Katayama government led to a serious socialist 
defeatinthe1949generalelection．（4別Asaresult，theJSPlostitspostTWar  
momentum，thoughitregainedmostofitslostvotesinthe1952general  
election．It also spoiled the politicalcareer of those who were newly  
electedafterthewar．They weredamagedbeforethey fully established  
theircredentials：manyOfthemwerenotreelected，Thiswasseriousfor  
a semi－Cardre party（49）such as theJSP，because the party depended  
COnSiderablyon thevotescastforeachJSP－backedcandidateforrather  
PerSOnalreasons．Besides，thefailureofthecoalitiongovernmentswasa  
prelude to the decline of the right wing，becauseit was the right－Wing  
leaders that accepted the agreement to a11y the party with the two  
COnSerVativepartiesinspiteoftheleft－wing’sopposition．   
TheJSPhad atleast one morechance to share power．TheJSP can  
COrneinto power ol巾T When the conser’Vatives are dividedinto a few  
partiesandwhen，atthesametime，nOSlnglepartycanellJOyamaJOrlty  
intheDiet．ThefirstsuchchancecametotheJSPin1947．Thesecondand  




factions．   
Seei11g the struggle among the conservatives，Minoru Takano，Chief  
executiveofSoわ′0（GeneralCouncilofJapaneseTradeUnions）andone  
Oftheleft－Wingleadersinthesocialistmovement，SuggeStedthattheJSP  
SuppOrtananti－Yoshida protagonist，MamoruShigemitsu，theleader（）f  
the Progressive Party to make a more acceptable government to the  
socialists．Itis said thatit was not feasibe to make a socialist－  
COnServative coalitionin those days，（50）but stillTakanoIs suggestionis  
noteworthy．Iftheyhaddaredto promoteShigemitsuasprimeminister，  
the socialistsmight atleast have succeededinintensifying the conflict  
amongtheconservativesandhavegottenclosertopower．   
Why did the JSP not seriouslv consider the possibility of another 
COalitiongovernment？Theofficialreasonwasthatitwasunacceptab】cto  
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blur the distinction beしWeen the progressive side and the conservative  
one．（51）Butsuchanexplanationisnotpersuasiveenough．Therecouldbe  
otherreasons．First，theleftwingoftheJSPwasinfluencedbyanarcho・  
Syndicalism and was apt to makelittle of governmentalactivities．（52）  
Indeed，it ot）pOSed the formation of the Katayama government，tOO．  
Second，manySOCialistsfearedthattheywouldimpairtheir“Shutaisei，”  
if they participated recklesslyin a coa】ition．The wurd“Shutaisei，”  
originated from Germanidealism，and as such means somethinglike  





the LDPin1955and did not allow theJSP to take advantage of the  
COnflicts among them anylonger 
5．LocalGovernment Alternative   
In most of theindustrialized countries，localgovernmentis another  
arena where politicalparties vylng for power at the nationallevelcan  
PrOVeitsabilitytorule．Whenapartyisoutofpoweratthenationallevel，  
it canimpress the voters with an alternative politicalcourse through  
Various activitiesinthelocalgovernmentsullderitscontrol．   




do underthedoctrineof ult7tlUires．Iftheywanttodosomethingwhich  
isnotlegallyarticulated，theymustask parliament topasslocalbillin  
Ordertoauthorizethemtodoit．Besides．that procedureislengthy and  
expensive．In America，Dilon’s rule functionsin the same way as the  
doctrineof ult771乙）i77？S．（53）Incontrast．Japaneselocalgovernmentscanin  
prlnCIPledo anythingthelawdoesnot prohibitthemfromdoing．（54）   
Thus，Torazo Ninagawa．a famousleftist governor of Kyoto Prefec－  
ture，WaSabletoimplementhisoriginalsubsidyprogramforthefarmers  
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Whenthecentralgovernmentcut one ofits agriculturalsubsidies．This  
helpedhimtogainmoresupportforhimself．Heimplementedmanyother  
POlicies different from the centralgovernment’s onesin such fields as  
education，Welfareandtheprotectionofsmallenterprises．Hewasorlgi－  
nallybackedby theJSPbut theJSP’sineptitude madehim a pro－JCP  
POliticianlater．（55）Hewasinofficefor28yearscontinuously．TheJCPin  
Kyoto prefecture succeededinraisingits share of the votes under the  
umbrellaofasympatheticprefecturalgovernment（seeFigure2）．（55）   
Another example may be more suggestive．In a smal1vi11agein the  
l10rthern part ofJapan，there was a talellted politician named Masao  
Fukazawa．fIewasborninSawauchiVillageinIwatePrefecture，elected  
to mayorofthevi11agcin1957a11ddiedinofficein1965．  
Inthe1950s，SawauchiVillage，justasmostofothervillagesinJapan7s  
backwardareas．wasverypoorandordinarypeOplewereleadingavery  
precariouslife．Above all，manyinfants and old people werein poor  
health，Partlybecause mostvi11agers weretoo poor to see a doctor as  
Oftenasnecessary，andpartlybecausethehealthadministrationdidnot  
function well．When Fukazawa took office，theinfant mortalityin the  
Villagewas6．96percent，thatis，70utOflOOnewlybornbabiesdiedbefore  
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Figure2 Shareof VotersinGeneralElections  
一一“JSPandJCPin Kyoto Prefecture  
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theirfirstbirthday．Today，theaveragerateinJapanisaboutCI．6percent．   
Fukazawa endeavored toimprove this state of affairs．Heinstituted  
freemedicinesystemforinfantsandpeopleolderthan60bysubsidising  
the nationalhealthinsurance system，though the vi11age’s financial  
marginwasnarrow．SawauchiVillagewasthefirstlocalgovernmentin  




Following his activities，theinfant mortality dropped remarkably，and  
WaSfinallyreducedtozeroin1962．However，themunicipalfinancesdid  
not gointo the red．except for during the earliest pcriod of his  
administration．（57）   
Fukazawa’s remarkable achievementsin Sawauchiimpressed many  
SOCialist politicians，though he himsclf was neither pro－SOCialist nor  
PrO－COnSerVative．The socialists started to adopt similar policies to  
CXempttheneedyfrommedicalfeeswhentheycameinto poweraLthe  




politicsin themidst of the age when economic values overwhelmed  
almosteveryoneelse 






and effectively managedlocalgovernments underits control，it could  
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Tablel．SocialistOr PrO－SocialistG（）VermOrS  
year 1947 51 55  59  6二う  67  71 75  79  83  即  
number  4   7   7   5   5   4   3   8   3   5   4  
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haveenjoyedmoresupport ofthe voters．ⅠIowever，theJSPwasrather  




many progressivelocalgovernments succeededin developlng eXCellent  
Welfareandenvironmentalpolicieslater，thuughmanyofthemcouldnot  
Stayln pOWerlong enough to entrench themselves agalnSt COnSerVative  
attacks．   
WhywastheJSP ratherindifferent tothe possibilityoflocaldemocL  
racy？Did theleft wing，Which was sympathetic to Marxism，SCOrn  
decentralization？（59）Suchquestionscouldbe raised，butin fact veryfew  
Jar）aneSe understood the significance of the chapter concerninglocal  
autonomywhenthenewconstitutionwasunderdiscussion．Thefailureof  
theJSPwasthatitdidnotsucceedinmakingpracticaluse ofopportu－  
nitiesit wasgiven．In contrast with theJSP，the conservatives success－  
fully adapted themselves to the newly decentralizedlocalgovernment  
systemusingcentralcontroleffectively．They did not welcome the new  
SyStembutwere quite shrewdin utilizlnglt pragmatically，   
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6．LeftWingDominanceandOrganizationalFallacy   
WhentheJSPwasformed，itwastherightwingthatledthepartyJn  
the1940srighトwingDiet members outnumberedtheleft－wing andthey  
formedtheKatayamagovernmentinspiteoftheskepticalattitし1deofthe  
leftwing．Butthedomina11CeOftherightwingdidnotlastlong．Theleft  
wing，being aminority at the nationallevel，SOOn began toincreasein  
force at thelocallevel．Andlocalactivists unsatisfied with right－Wlng  
leadership strivedtosendleft・wing delegatestoJSP’s nationalconven－  
tions．Besides，Sb毎0mi1itants，Who supported theleftwing，joined the  
JSP one after another．In the meantime，the rightlost suchinfluential  
leaders as Hirano and Nishioin1948：Hirano was purgedbyGHQ and  
NishiowasexpelledfromthepalJtyoWingtotheShodenScandal．   
Theleft－Wingadvanceintensifiedtheconflictwithin theJSP－Theleft  
SuCCeededindefeatingtherightintheelectionforthesecretarygeneral  
．二lノ了  
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in1950，thougha rightLWingleader was reelected to chairman of the  
centralexecutive committee（CEC）at the same time．At the seventh  
COnVentioninJanuary，1951，theleft－wingdelegatesclearlyoutnumbered  
the right．Finally，theleft also overwhe］med the rightin the House of  
Representatives．Sincethen，theleftwinghasmoreorlessdominatedthe  
JSPtillMasatsuguIshibashiwaselectedtoChairmanoftheCECin1983．   
Whydidtheleft wingcome todominate theJSP so rapidly？Several  
answerscanbegiven．First，therightwascrippledbythepurgeofsome  
influentialleaderslikeJotaro Kawakami，1ater Chairman of the CEC，  
They could not act freely either to increase their own followers or to 
Organizepeoplesympatheticwithmoderatesocialdemocracylngeneral，  
Incontrastwiththeright，theleftwinghadonlyonepurgee．   
Second，the backgroud of the right－wingleaders must be questioned．  
Mostcanbedividedintothreecategories：1eftistintellectuals，1eadersof  
theprewarlabourmovement，andleadersoftheprewartenant farmers  
movemenL（60）Except fortheintellectuals，theytendedtoleadthemove－  
mentin a kind of paternalistic style：they often formed a smallinner  
Circlein which they behaved authoritatively．The relationship between  
theleadersandtheirfollowersresembledthesocalled“Oyabun－Kobun”  
（bossThenchman）relationship or patron－Client one．They were alsoin－  
ClinedtoregardtheseniorltySyStemaSimportant．Needlesstosay，SuCh  
an old－fashioned style ofleadership was unacceptable to the younger  
generation，eSPeCiallyinthepostwarlabourmovement．Thatissaidtobe  
OneOfthemainreasonswhyleft－mindedactivistssuchasMinoruTakano  
took controlof Sb／ひ0，the】argest organizationinthelabourmovement．  
Helookedself－COntrOlledandintellectualenoughtoattractmanyyounger  
activists．（61）   
Third，Sb／ひO POSitivelysupported theleftwingafter1952．Sb毎o was  
establishedin1950and GHQ supportedit at first；it was expected to  
developinto a moderatelabour movement．Theleadership of Sohyo．  
however，WaSeaSilytakenoverbytheleft，thefirstleaderofwhichwas  
Takano．Sbわ′OWaSrathertightlyorganizedandsuccessfullycontroledits  
members．Compared with 5bjtyo，right－Oriented trade unions，Which  
SuPpOrted the right wing of theJSP，Were Smaller and moreloosely  
Organized．  








War：inItaly and French，thecommunist partiesadvanced，andevenin  
England，the Labour Party took over the governmentin spite of the  
tactfulleadership of Sir Winston Churchillduring the War．InJapan，  
SOmepeOple，eSpeCiallyintellectuals，WeredeeplyfacinatedwiththeJCP．  




sect ofMarxism（62）called“Ronoha，”attractedthosewhowerenotsatis－  
fiedwiththepresentstate ofJapan．   
Finally，however，theJapanese communists radicalized theJSPin a  
SenSe．Untilthedefeat ofJapan，COmmunists hadbeen almost the only  
force thatbravelyresistedmilitalism．Somecommunistsweremurdered  
by thepolice and some were under detention for more than ten years．  
Moreover，theyanticipatedthedefeatofJapanwithscientificanalysis．In  
contrast，SOCialists were helpless．Most of them did not dare to fight  
against militarydolninance；SOme Of them even supported theinvasive  
War pOlicies of the government．This difference with the communists  
engendered a kind ofinferiority complexin theirminds．Thus，‘‘the  
burdenofhistory”incessantlyweighedontheJSPandradicalizedit．（63）   
Anyway，theleftwardswingoftheJSPbroughtthe party some diffi－  
Cultiesbecauseleft・wingactivistswereapttobetooidealistic．Most of  
thembelievedinthe“Ronoha”doctrine，Whichwasratheridealistic and  
a kind of Marxism．They were also affected by anarcho－Syndicalisme．  
Theybelievedthattheirmostimportantmissionwasnottoimprovethe  
misce11aneous things of everydaylife，but to fight againstJapanese  
monopolistic capitalism for allthe working classes．Theyintended to  
COnVertJapanintoasocialistcountrywithinashortperiodafterwinning  
amajoritylntheDiet andtogovernthiscountrythroughparliamentary  
democracy．Nevertheless，theydidnot attachenoughimportancetothe  
27  
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parliamentary struggle，Their way of thinkingis typically foundin  
MosaburoSuzuki’sassertion，Suzukiwasoneofthetopleadersoftheleft  
WingandwasChairmanoftheCECoftheJSPbetween1955L60．Hesaid  
as follows：  
Whenever the possibility of theJSP to participatein a  
coalition becomes a significant politicalissue，thatis not  
SimplybecausetheJSPisoneofmajorpartiesintheDiet，but  
alsobecauseanygovernment，withouttheparticipationofthe  
JSP，CannOt enjoy enoughsupport among a】1the working  
people who constitute95per cent of the whole nation：mOSt  
peoplewillalways find the partyindispensable to a stasble  
cabinet．The weight of theJSPin any coalition government  




represent allthe working classes．Theleft－1eaning socialists always  
dreamedofaPrOmisingfuture，aSumlngthatthereweremassiveworking  
PeOPlewhoklfen［b／SuPPOrtedtheJSPeventhoughnotatthepollstations．  
Followlng thisview，they were apt to think more of mass movements  
OutSidetheDietthanofactionsinsidetheDiet，Theyregardedtheelection  
asonlyoneofthemeanstoachievetherevolution．   
Suchmass－mOVementLOrientedstrategysometimesgavetheJSPconsid－  
erablevetopower．Butatthesametime，itmadethe partylook uncon－  
StruCtive．Some peoplebeganto hold a stereotypedimagethat theJSP  
OppOSedeverything．Moreover，theactivistsandtheDietmembersbelong－  
ingtotheleftwingoftenconsidereditacompromisewiththemonopolis－  
tic capital to search for and offer feasible or realistic alternatives to 
governmentalpoliciesthroughactivitiesintheDiet．Theleftwardswing  
OftheJSPseemstohavesomewhatdeprivedthepartyofitscapacityto  
COPeWithrealsociety．   
Nevertheless，itisdangeroustoexaggeratethenegativeeffects．Forit  
isatleast certainthat manypeoplevotedfortheJSPbecausetheyhad  
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ahighopLnionofitsnon－armamentandabsoluteneutra】ismpolicyinthe  
diplomatic sphere．People were stillobsessed with the nightmarish  
memories of the war．Andin the1950s，theleft wing of theJSP was  
almosttheonlyforcethatclearlyrejectedanyformofJapaneserearma－  
ment．Intherightwing，thereweresomewhoratherpositivelysupported  
therearmamentpolicy andtheUS－Japan Security Treaty．   
Aboveall，itwastheleft wingthat contrjbuted totheJSP’srecovery  
from the defeatin the1949generalelection（Table2and3）．Theleft－  
wing’s rate ofincreasein the number ofseatsin the Lower House was  
alwayshigherthanthat oftherightduringthe1950s．Inthosedays，the  
rightwingwascomparativelystronglnthemetropolitanareasbutweak  
irlruralareas．Buttheleftwingadvancedinbothareas．（65）Thesuccessin  
ruralareasexplainsits rapidadvance．Andit was，in turn，5bわ′O Which  
helpedthegrowthoftheleft．   
TheJSP did not，and does not，haveits own mass organization to  
developeffectiveelectioncampaignsbyitself，The number oftheJSP’s  
memberhasbeenunderseventythousand，uSuallyfortyorfiftythousand  
exceptforashortperiodjustafterthewarwhenjtwasaroundahundred  
thousand．Besides，there werenoJSP’sbranchesintwo thirdsofallthe  
municipalitiesin the1950s．（66）It wasimpossible for the party to obtain  
】62   
TableZ．SocialistM．P．sbelongiIlgtOEach oftheRight and theLeftWings  
し）f theJSP  
1951  1952  1953  1955  1958  
Right  29  57  66  67  56薫  
Left  16  54  72  89  91 r 
・Calculated by Tokyo Shirnbun   
Tab7e3．Support andSharc ofElectorate（JSP）duringitsDivision（195l－55）（％）  
Right wing  Left wing  
Support  Share  Support  Share  
1952  11．4  9．7  3．1  7．4  
1953  14．8  9．9  8．3  9．6  
1955  12．3  10．4  8．8  11．5  
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labourforce．Itsupportedespeciallytheleftwingatleastinthe1950s．   
Snhyoincluded，andincludes，the strong trade unionsinthe public  
sector，WhichwereglVenthegeneralnameofKanko777．Kankorounions  
SuChastheraiLwayworkers’unionsandthepostalunionareubiqitousin  
most parts ofthecoutry．Thisis tosay that theleft winghaspowerful  
SuppOrting organizationsin ruralareas as wellasin urban areas．The  
localbranches of the Sohyo consisting mainly of Kankoro workers  
CamPaignedactivelyfortheJSP，eSpeCiallyfortheleftwingcandidates．  
Ajournalist reported about union－SuppOrtedcampaigns of theleft wing  
around1953as follows：  
TheLocalcampaignheadquartersoftheJSPareestablished  
basedon］ocalbranchesofSo）り，0”．．Inmostcases，botharethe  
Same Organizations．The S（）hyo branches financially back up  
theleft，wing candidates and mobilize volunteer workers for  
thecampalgnlng，  
AtabranchoftheWorkers’UnionoftheNationalRailway，  
they have alist ofallthemember workers．The name of the  
WOrkersareclassifiedaccordingtotheiraddresses．Andtheir  
addresses are．in turn，grOuPed systematical1yinto their con－  
Stituencies…．Thatlistiscruciallyusefulinelectioncampalgn  
activities．（67）  
Besides money and campaign organizations，Sohyo provided theJSP，  
especia11yitsleftwing，withhumanresources：PartymembersandcandiL  
dates．Forinstance，52．7percent oftheJSPmembers were workersin  
1958．（68）Inthesameyear，29percentoftheJSP’smembersoftheLower  
House were fromtrade unions，though the percentage was only13．5in  
1952（excludingprewarleadersofthelabourmovements）．（69）Thenumber  
Of Diet membersfrom thetrade unionsintheJSPcontinuedtoincrease  
gradually throughout the1950s and the1960s（see Figure3）．Thus，the  
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easily．But，atthesametime，theydidnot necessarilycommitted them・  
Selvesstronglywiththeconservativepartiesorspecificpolicies．Roughly  
speaking，SOmeOfthemvotedforconservativecandidatesonly because  
theywereaskedtodosobysomeoneelse，Oftenlocalnotableswhowere  
COnSerVativeinapoliticalsensealmostwithoutexception，Theyrespect－  
ed human networks which werein many cases under theinfluence of  
notables．Then．whensocialistsmadeuseofsuchnetworksinelectioneer－  
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belongingto Soわ，O haveneverbeenintegratedinto asinglegroup，Ora  
slnglefaction．Eachofthemwas，andis，tOOdcpendentonhisownunion  
which hadits owninterests：thcy were representatives of their mother  
unioIIS first of all．Henceitwassaid that theDietmembersfrom Sohyo  
didnothaveconsistentoppinionsinpolicyproblems，ClinglngtOinterests  
of their mother organizations．（72）Moreover，there have been few top  
leadersoftheJSPfromSbhyo sofar，nOChairmanoftheCECandonly  
three secretary generals．MasatsuguIshibashi，Chairman of the CEC  
during1983－86，tObesure，isfromthepostwarlabourmovement．Buthe  
is not a typicalSbjりrO－brandedDiet member．He was only30yeas old  
when he was elected Diet member for the first timein1953．   
Anothercriticsays：thedependencconSohyoisoneofmajorobstacles  
fortheJSPtoobtainmc）reelectoralsupport．Butitisinfacttheorgan－  
izationalpower of Sbjzyo that has propped up theJSP．InJapan，the  
Organization，Orthesocialnetwork，Oftenplaysacrucialroleinelections．   
The LDP，Which washeavily dependent on the traditionalsocialnet－  
WOrksandcommunityorganizationsinruralareas，losttheshareofthe  
electoratelinearlyin the course of the higheconomic growthperiodin  
Whichtheruralpopulationdecreasedsteadily．Thegapbetweenthehigh  
SuppOrt for the Ll）P at opinion pollsand the LDP’s comparativelylow  
Shareoftheelectorateintheredayscan，atleastpartly，beexplainedby  
this socialnetwork hypothesis．Since themid－1g70s，the LDP has found  
new supportfrs in urban areas but has not been necessarily able to 
mobilizemostofthemtothepollingstations，prObablybecausetherehas  
beennlanySuppOrterSinurbanareaswho areoutofthesocia】networks  
which are under conservativecontrol．（73）   
Onthecontrary，beforetheendofthehigheconomicgrowthperiodin  
1973，the LDP enjoyed more supportin the generalelections thanin  
OplnlOnPO11s，eXCePt forafewcases，Partlybecauseitwasabletomake  
use of traditionalsocialnetworkslike community organizations and  
Variouskindsofinterestsgroups（seeFigure4）．Thatis，SOmepeOplewho  
answered they did not support any parties voted for the LDP in the 
elections．AsfortheJSP，thegapbetweenthetwoindiceshasbeenquite  
narrowwith the only exception of1947（see Figure5），This probably  
meansthattheJSPhasnotbeenabletomobilizealmostanynetworksor  
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1ed to conservatization of the attitude DfJSP’s Diet members because  
sollle Ofthem havebeen recruited according to theseniority system of  
SL）hyu．＜74）Theleft wlng With strong supportive organizations obtained  
rnoresupportinthegeneralelectionsthanintheoplnionpolls；inthecase  
oftherightwingwhichhadonlyweak，ifany，SuPPOrtlngOrganizations，  
the relatiorlbetween the twoindices was the reverse（see Table3）．   
TheJSP should have tried to find otlt，Or Create，Various types of  
supportingorganizations．Thefarmers’organizationshavealreadybeen  
mentioned above．Among other possible alternatives were consumers  




andlearned muchmoreofthecomplicatedaspectsoftherealworld：its  
puliciescouldhavcbccnnlOreSOphisticated．   
The socialist politicians should have developed their own“Koenkai”  
Organizations，tOO，Of course，they did have ones．But many of their  
Or’ganizationsweresmal】andtheirmember’swereoftenthesameasthose  
（」floca15bhyounions．Notenoughsocialistsmanagedtopenetratedeeply  
intolocalcommunities or other socialnetworks．In contrast with the  
SOCialists，COnSrVatives has been strenuously trying to enlarge their  
Koenkai．Indeed，KoenkaiisthekeyorganizationinLDPDietmembers  
electioneeringwhercoldlocalcommunitiesornotablesalreadylosttheir  
holdoverlocalpeople．   
However，theJSP has endeavoured to become a mass party to be  
independentevenofSohyoinvain．SocialistsoftenconsideredtheLabour  
I〕artyin Britain as a typicalandidealmass r）arty．The founders of the  
JSP respectedit as their example to follow，On this point，Japanese  
POliticalscientistsshouldalsoshareresponsibilty．Theyofteninculcated  
the myth of the上うritish Labour Partyin the minds of the peop】e：they  
OfteninsistedthattheLabourPatywasthemostdevelopedmasspartyin  
the democratic world．Even a famous Mar’xist politicalscientistlike  
FukujiTaguchioncecr・iticized theJSPin coTnParisonwith the Labour  
I）arty．（75）  
InJapan，WherepeOPle are passive，aS Hrebenar pointed out，and  
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reluctanttojoinanypoliticalparty，itisverydifficulttoformatypical  
massparty．Eventhe LDP，WhichhasgovernedJapan for morethan30  
years，hasnotsucceededincreatingitsowneffectivemasspartyorgani－  
Zation・ButtheLDPhasbeenshrewderioughtorelyonvarioussupporting  
Organizations．   
Of course，the organizationalpower or the ability to utilize social  
networksdoesnotexplaincompletely thedifferencein strengthamong  
theparties：thecapacitytoformu】ateeffectivepolicies，theabilitytorun  
attractivecandidates，andfinancialpower，amOngOthers，arealsoimpor－  
tant．Butitisratherdifficult for any party to maintain a considerable  
amountofvoteswithoutbasicsupportingorganizations．Inasense．itwas  
lack ofwiderange ofsupportingorganizationsthat crippledtheJSP．It  
isnowonderthatveryfewordinarypeopledaredto］Ointheparty，Seeing  
that even a large majority of the workers who devoted themselves to 
electioncampaignsfortheJSPdidnotvolunteertoobtainmembershipin  
the party．   
At the1963generalelection，26incumbent Diet members oftheJSP，  
including abouttenleading figures，lost theirseats．Most ofthemrelied  
mainlyupontheirpersonalpopularityandsucceededinholdingtheirseats  
foralongtime：theyhadbeenlessdependentonthelabororganizations．  
Intheirplace，manyCandidatessupportedby Sbhyo werenewlyelected．  
Fortunately，the totalloss for theJSP wasonly one seat，OWing to the  
SuCCeSSOfthosenewcomers，inspiteofthedefeatoftheinfluentials．Such  
aphenomenonhadalreadybeenobservedattheendofthe1950s．（76）The  
plateauonwhich theJSP stayed during the1960s reflected the equilib－  
riumbetweentheexitofsomeDietmembersrelylngmainlyontheirown  






smallKocnkai．（77）   
The decline of the old right deprived theJSP ofits urban character  
because the right wing was comparatively popularin the metropolitan  
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in the1960s．The CGP was backed by a strong religious organization  
mainlyin the metropolitan areas．TheJCP succeededin organizing  
Variouskindsofpeoplesuchaswomen，yOungpeOple，Smallentrepreneurs  
andmerchants，besidesitsownsmall－SCaledbutmi11itantmassorganiza－  









Figure6 VotesfortheJSPanditsShareoftheElectoratein  
TokyoandKanagawaPrefectures  
（ingeneralelections）  
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Of the non－Organized voters who used to vote forit supporting the  
non－armament pOlicy，Or being attractedbythe persona7ities oftheoJd  
typeCandidates．Anyway，the gap between the number of the whole  
registered voters and theJSP’s party votewidened，namely，theJSP’s  
Shareoftheelectoratedroppedsharply．Onthecontrary，thepartyforthe  
mostpartkeptboththevotersthemselvesandtheshareoftheelectorate  
it had obtainedin the1950sin ruralareas where population did not  
increase so much．The decline of theJSPis mainly reducible toits  
COmParativesetbackinthemetropolitanareas．  
154   
（thousand）  
1949  52   53   56   58   60   63  67   69   72   76   79  
Figure7 VotesfortheJSPanditsShare of the Electoratein  




153  5．7五郎／  
（【hou5and）  
76   79   と；0  49  52  53  56  58  60  63  67  69 72  
Figure8 VotesfortheJSPanditsShareoftheElectoratejn  
the ShikokuDistrict  （ingeneralelections）  
Conclusion  
Duringthe195Osandthe1960s，Japanunderwentasortofupheaval．A  




WaS5L4times aslarge as thatin1955．Following this drastic changein  
Japanesesociety，theJapanesepoliticalmapchanged，tOO．Thetwomajor  
Parties，the LDP and theJSP，mOre Orless declined and other small  
Partiesadvanced．Nevertheless，theLDPremainedinpowerthroughthis  
Period，partly because of theineptitude of the opposition parties，in  
particular，thatoftheJSP，andpartlybecausetheruralandconscrvative  
areaswereoverTrePreSentedintheDietowlngtOtheunfaira1locationof  
theseatsamongdifferent constituencies．   
Would theJSP havehadabrighter futureifithadbeenmoremature  
during the first ha】f ofitslife？The answer could be positive，though  
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OppreSSedbythegovernmentinthosedays．（79）   
Politicalcultureis，however，nOtalwaysunchangeableanditwastrue  
withJapanatthattime；nOtallthepeoplewerecapturedbytheoldway  
Of thinking．TheJSP surely had varioLISpOSSibilities，if not enough，tO  
Obtainmoresupportfromthevoters．Buttheypaidlittleattentiontothe  
OutSide，andwasted much energyinsterileintra－party COntrOVerSies．   




wrong to overestimatetheimpact oftheleftward swing upon theJSP．  
The past achievements of the DSP，Which wasestablished by the right  
Wing wholeft theJSPin1959，Shows clearly thatitis difficult for  
socialists or social democratic parties to obtain much support only by 
Shiftingtheirstance towardsthe right．The DSP has everbeen a5per  
CentpartySinceitsbirth．（80）   
One ofthemajorfallacies oftheJSP wasanorganizationalone．The  
JSPdidnotfullyunderstandthepoliticalsignificanceofoutsideorganiza－  
tions．Itclungtothelargestlabourorganization，So妙0，andatthesame  
time tried or pretended to try to freeitself from this dependency．1t  
dreamed ofthe“ideal”masspartyinJapan and neglected other organ－  
izationalpossibilities．But depending deliberately on and representlng  
Variousorganizationsisfruitfulto apoliticalpartynot onlyintermsof  
electioneeringbutalsointermsofpolicydevelopment．   
TheJSPshouldalsohavebeenmoreinterestedin power onthelocal  
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1evelon wellas on the nationa11evel．It should have tried to form a  
coalitionwithotherparties，Whenevertherewasachance・Thegoverning  
ability of a partyis oneofthe mostimportant considerations forthe  
electoratetochooseamongtheparties．IftheJSPhadbeenmoreambi，  
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